# ScopeDOPE™ — Valuation Analysis

**Prepared by:** Cold Bore Ballistics™ LLC
**Status:** Internal — Highly Confidential
**Companion to:** `SCOPEDOPE_VALUATION_BRIEF.md` §7 (answers all seven questions in order)
**Revenue basis:** `SCOPEDOPE_REVENUE_PROJECTION.md` (pricing: $29.99 launch /
$44.99 primary; blended in-app fee **15.0%–21.5%**)

> ⚠ **PROVISIONAL — time-sensitive inputs.** Two external matters resolve within
> ~3 weeks of this draft and could move the numbers:
> - **Apple:** Supreme Court cert/stay petition expected late June / early July 2026
>   (Ninth Circuit upheld contempt but remanded the external-link commission rate).
> - **Google:** post-settlement fee structure goes live **June 30, 2026** (US/UK/EEA).
>
> All store-fee-dependent figures below are modeled as a **band** to carry this
> uncertainty explicitly. Re-verify both rulings before relying on these numbers.

> **What changed from rev 0.9 (2026-06-05):**
> 1. Store fee corrected from 8.5% to a **15.0%–21.5%** band (root input — see
>    `SCOPEDOPE_REVENUE_PROJECTION.md` §1.1/§3.1). Year-1 net is now a band; the
>    old point figures sit at the *top* of each band.
> 2. Kestrel 5700 Elite price corrected **$560 → ~$700**, which *raises* the
>    defensive-displacement profit at risk.
> 3. Competitor facts refreshed: AB "Quantum" freemium, Hornady 4DOF now $4.99,
>    onX $1.4B Series C.
> 4. Comparable multiples **re-confirmed** against Acquire.com (Jan 2026) and
>    Aventis (2026): 3–6× framing stands.
> 5. Risk-adjusted 12-month EV moves **~$933K → ~$827K** (fee correction, partly
>    offset by stronger Kestrel math).

---

## Table of Contents

1. [Pre-Launch IP Value (§7 Q1)](#1-pre-launch-ip-value)
2. [Valuation Inflection Milestones (§7 Q2)](#2-valuation-inflection-milestones)
3. [Licensing vs. Acquisition Threshold (§7 Q3)](#3-licensing-vs-acquisition-threshold)
4. [Acquirer Analysis — Ranked (§7 Q4)](#4-acquirer-analysis--ranked)
5. [Risk-Adjusted 12-Month Valuation (§7 Q5)](#5-risk-adjusted-12-month-valuation)
6. [Printing Workflow Patent Decision (§7 Q6)](#6-printing-workflow-patent-decision)
7. [Comparable Acquisitions (§7 Q7)](#7-comparable-acquisitions)
8. [Summary Valuation Table](#8-summary-valuation-table)

---

## 1. Pre-Launch IP Value

*§7 Q1: What is the estimated value of this IP at pre-launch stage (development complete, zero installs)?*

### 1.1 What Exists at Pre-Launch

At pre-v1.0.0 with v1.0 imminent, the following assets are complete and owned outright:

| Asset | Type | Protection | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| DOPE-Blend™ methodology | Novel field-correction methodology | Trade secret (NDA + access controls) | Complete |
| Wireless scope label printing workflow | Novel workflow | Patent candidate | Unfiled |
| `.dope` file format | Open standard | Custom Open Specification License | Published at launch |
| Ballistics engine source code | Proprietary software | Copyright (registration pending) | Complete |
| ScopeDOPE brand | Trademark | USPTO filing pending | Pending |
| "Ballistic Computer" mark | Trademark | USPTO filing pending | Pending |

Total cash invested to reach this point: approximately **$1,445** in LLC and IP
filings. The development asset was built on founder time — not purchased. The
cost to replicate this system independently (2 engineer-years minimum, plus IP
and methodology development) substantially exceeds the cash investment.

### 1.2 Valuation by Buyer Type

Pre-revenue, development-complete software IP is valued entirely by the buyer's
strategic context. There is no single "correct" number — there is a range by
buyer type.

**Financial buyer / passive acquirer.** Value basis: replacement cost only.
- Mobile app development at MVP complexity: $60K–$150K
- IP novelty premium (minimal, not yet proven): $0–$50K
- **Range: $50K–$200K** — distressed or opportunistic only

**Strategic acquirer — opportunistic (Garmin, Hornady).** Value basis:
build-vs-buy and time-to-market.
- Equivalent internal development cost: $450K–$800K (18 months, 2 engineers at
  market rate, plus methodology R&D)
- Market-entry acceleration: 12–18 months gained
- IP novelty premium: DOPE-Blend and printing workflow are genuinely novel
- **Range: $500K–$1.5M** to the right opportunistic acquirer

**Strategic acquirer — defensive (Nielsen-Kellerman / Kestrel).** The Kestrel
5700 Elite is the market standard at **~$700** (street ~$632 discounted;
[Kestrel](https://kestrelballistics.com/kestrel-5700x-elite-weather-meter-with-applied-ballistics)).
The complete ScopeDOPE system at ~$225 directly targets that market.

Defensive value calculation (**updated to $700 Kestrel**):
- If ScopeDOPE achieves 10,000 installs at $44.99 primary: ~$450K revenue,
  largely irrelevant to Kestrel
- The real risk: ScopeDOPE reaches 50,000+ installs and becomes the default
  recommendation in every NRL22 community
- At 50,000 installs, potential Kestrel displacement: 10,000–20,000 units ×
  **$700** = **$7.0M–$14.0M** Kestrel revenue at risk
- At 40% Kestrel gross margin: **$2.8M–$5.6M** protected annual profit
- Defensive acquisition premium: 1–2× protected annual profit =
  **$2.8M–$11.2M at full-threat scale**
- Pre-launch, discounted for execution risk and market uncertainty:
  **$500K–$1.5M**

> The corrected $700 Kestrel price *raises* the defensive ceiling vs rev 0.9
> ($560 → $2.24M–$4.48M protected profit). The pre-launch discounted figure is
> unchanged because pre-launch the displacement threat is still speculative.

**Conclusion — Pre-Launch Range**

| Buyer context | Estimated range |
|---|---|
| Financial / passive | $50K–$200K |
| Strategic — opportunistic | $500K–$1.5M |
| Strategic — defensive (NK) | $500K–$2M |
| With printing patent issued | Add $200K–$500K to any strategic range |

**The pre-launch IP is worth between $500K and $2M to a strategic acquirer.** The
printing workflow patent, if pursued and granted before any acquisition
conversation, materially increases the floor — it converts a trade-secret defense
into an enforceable IP barrier.

---

## 2. Valuation Inflection Milestones

*§7 Q2: What install and revenue milestones represent meaningful valuation inflection points?*

### Milestone Map

| Install count | Evidence tier | What changes for valuation |
|---|---|---|
| **Launch (0 → 1)** | Existence | IP assets verified; app is live; market hypothesis testable |
| **~500 installs** | Community traction | Sniper's Hide / NRL22 validation; first barrel maker conversation credible; trademark ROI confirmed |
| **~2,000 installs** | Revenue proof | Year 1 Solid scenario confirmed; blended Year 1 net **~$72K–$78K**; first Krieger partnership likely; earnout-style acquisition viable |
| **~5,000 installs** | IP + revenue convergence | Patent filing ROI justified; Solid Year 1 net confirmed; acquisition range $600K–$1.5M; data licensing first conversations begin |
| **~10,000 installs** | Recurring + data | Cloud sync ARR initiated (~$30K ARR); Community DOPE Exchange active; first B2B data license conversation realistic; acquisition range $750K–$2M+ |
| **~20,000 installs** | Platform status | Data asset density across calibers; 2–3 B2B licensees; acquisition range $2M–$6M+ |
| **First signed B2B data license** | Category re-rate | Single largest step-change — company stops being valued as an app and starts being valued as a ballistic data company. Multiplier applies to the entire business. |

### Revenue Triggers That Matter to Acquirers

- **$50K net Year 1 (Solid scenario):** Operational sustainability confirmed;
  Zoho upgrade triggered; patent filing justified by revenue. *(All points in the
  corrected Solid band — $72K–$78K — clear this comfortably.)*
- **$100K net cumulative:** Meaningful business with proven community traction
- **$25K ARR from any recurring source:** Blended acquisition multiple starts
  applying a SaaS premium to the full company
- **First B2B license signed:** Entire business re-rated from app to data company

---

## 3. Licensing vs. Acquisition Threshold

*§7 Q3: At what stage does this become a credible acquisition target vs. a licensing/partnership candidate?*

### Stage 1 — Partnership and Distribution (0–1,000 installs)

No company will acquire ScopeDOPE this early. The correct relationship is
partnership: barrel makers (Krieger, Bartlein, Brux) for distribution code
bundles; optics brands (Apex, Arken, Tract, Element) for soft endorsement;
WeatherFlow-Tempest for sensor recommendation and eventual reseller arrangement.
These build the install base and community proof that makes acquisition credible
later.

### Stage 2 — Licensing Candidate (1,000–3,000 installs)

A company with strategic interest might approach for IP licensing rather than
full acquisition. **Defensive response:** do not license the core methodology;
license only the `.dope` format (already openly licensed). Licensing the
DOPE-Blend methodology creates a competitor. **Exception:** an ELEY or SK Ammunition
*data* partnership is licensing-style and should be pursued — it deepens the data
moat without giving away methodology.

### Stage 3 — Earnout-Style Acquisition (2,000–5,000 installs)

An acquirer has enough data to structure an earnout. A Nielsen-Kellerman earnout
(pay on Kestrel attachment rate with ScopeDOPE integration) would be natural.
Reject earnout structures tied solely to install count with no acquirer
contribution to growth.

### Stage 4 — Straightforward Acquisition (5,000–15,000 installs)

Revenue trajectory, community proof, and IP portfolio justify a clean
acquisition. The patent (if filed at ~5,000 installs) is likely pending or
granted; multiple revenue streams exist; the DOPE database has material density.
**This is the target exit window if acquisition is the objective.** At the lower
end (5,000 installs) the corrected Solid Year 1 confirms **~$72K–$78K** net; at
the upper end (15,000) the data-licensing layer is forming. Beyond 20,000
installs the business becomes premium territory with a B2B licensing moat.

---

## 4. Acquirer Analysis — Ranked

*§7 Q4: Which of the identified acquirers has the strongest strategic rationale?*

Ranked by probability × deal size (most likely to close × most valuable).

### Tier 1 — Most Probable, Highest Strategic Rationale

**#1 — Nielsen-Kellerman (Kestrel)**

| Attribute | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Competitive threat | Existential — ScopeDOPE displaces a ~$700 Kestrel at ~1/15th the app price |
| IP they want | Printing workflow (Kestrel has none at any price); DOPE-Blend (extends "field calibration" into a methodology) |
| Acquisition rationale | Defensive + additive: eliminate the threat AND gain the only feature (printing) no competing product offers |
| Likely deal structure | Asset acquisition or full company; printing workflow is the primary IP target |
| Timing | Most likely at 5,000–10,000 installs when the disruption threat is visible |
| Acquisition range | $750K–$3M depending on install base at time of approach |
| Probability | **High** — ScopeDOPE's growth is a board-level risk for NK at scale |

> The "~1/15th" figure reflects the corrected $700 Kestrel ($700 / $44.99 = 15.6×).
> Rev 0.9 said "1/12th" against the old $560 price; the gap is now *wider*, which
> sharpens the displacement narrative.

**#2 — Hornady Manufacturing**

| Attribute | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Current software position | 4DOF app is now **$4.99** (no longer free; [Hornady](https://www.hornady.com/4dofapp)), widely used, but no DOPE management, no printing, no lot-level tracking |
| IP they want | DOPE-Blend (extends 4DOF from physics-only to reality-corrected); printing workflow; .dope format stewardship |
| Acquisition rationale | Additive: makes their 4DOF ecosystem the most capable in the market; adds printing; gives them .dope authority |
| Likely deal structure | App acquisition + ongoing development; Hornady brand replaces CBB brand on the combined product |
| Timing | 3,000–8,000 installs; Hornady moves slowly — approach early, expect a long cycle |
| Acquisition range | $600K–$2M |
| Probability | **Medium-High** |

### Tier 2 — Strategic Fit, Lower Probability

**#3 — Apex Optics**

| Attribute | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Current position | #7 PRS scope brand, growing fast; no app for scope users; explicitly building a competition ecosystem |
| IP they want | ScopeDOPE as their ecosystem app — turns Apex from a scope brand into a complete competition system (ScopeDOPE + Apex Nemesis scope under one brand) |
| Acquisition rationale | Product-ecosystem completion |
| Likely deal structure | Distribution partnership first (~500 installs), then acquisition conversation if traction is strong |
| Timing | 3,000–10,000 installs, after partnership is established |
| Acquisition range | $500K–$1.5M (Apex is VC-backed, Series A stage) |
| Probability | **Medium** — depends heavily on Apex's growth trajectory |

**#4 — Garmin**

| Attribute | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Current position | Dominant in outdoor GPS; expanding into precision outdoor sports; recent inReach and Tacx acquisitions show appetite |
| IP they want | DOPE-Blend + printing as a precision-rifle data layer on top of their mapping/GPS ecosystem |
| Acquisition rationale | Fits "serious outdoor enthusiast" positioning; ScopeDOPE data could integrate with Garmin GPS for position-aware firing solutions |
| Caveat | Precision rifle is a smaller niche than Garmin typically targets; they must be convinced the TAM justifies it |
| Timing | Not before 10,000 installs; Garmin needs to see market validation first |
| Acquisition range | $1M–$5M (Garmin pays for proven products, not speculative ones) |
| Probability | **Medium-Low** — niche size is the limiting factor |

**#5 — Applied Ballistics (Bryan Litz)**

| Attribute | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Current position | Independent; now markets **AB Quantum** with a free "Ultralite" tier and $2.99/mo–$19.99/yr Elite, free when paired to an AB Elite device ([Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.appliedballisticsllc.appliedballistics)). Kestrel integration is a partnership, not an acquisition |
| IP they want | If anything: access to the community DOPE dataset as a complement to the Litz BC library |
| Acquisition rationale | The DOPE-Blend methodology implicitly challenges the Litz approach (real-world correction vs. measured BC); AB would either integrate or neutralize it |
| Likely deal structure | AB is small, founder-operated — more likely a data-sharing/licensing **partner** than an acquirer |
| Acquisition range | N/A — partnership/data-sharing, not an acquisition |
| Probability | **Low** — more likely a data partnership than an acquisition |

> AB's aggressive move to free/freemium (Quantum Ultralite) is a competitive
> signal worth noting: the dominant subscription engine is pushing *price down*,
> reinforcing the Price Point thesis that ScopeDOPE's one-time $44.99 sits in a
> different category rather than competing head-to-head on subscription price.

### Tier 3 — Unlikely Acquirers

**ZCO, Kahles, Element, Athlon:** optics hardware companies without software
acquisition capability or history. Partnership distribution is the correct
relationship; an acquisition would require them to become a software company.
Rule out as acquisition targets.

### Strategic Recommendation

**Build toward Nielsen-Kellerman as the primary exit path.** The defensive
rationale is strongest and most time-sensitive — and is *stronger* at the
corrected $700 Kestrel price. Do not approach NK until 5,000 installs; before
that, ScopeDOPE is not threatening enough to trigger defensive action. At 5,000
installs with a patent pending on the printing workflow, the leverage is high.

**Maintain Hornady as the secondary path.** A friendly approach positioned as
"extending 4DOF into the field" rather than "replacing it" opens a productive
conversation. Approach with DOPE-Blend as additive to their physics methodology.

---

## 5. Risk-Adjusted 12-Month Valuation

*§7 Q5: What is the risk-adjusted valuation range at 12 months post-launch assuming modest, solid, and strong adoption scenarios?*

### Methodology

Year-1 net is the **corrected band** from `SCOPEDOPE_REVENUE_PROJECTION.md`
(blended in-app fee 15.0%–21.5%). Valuation applies two layers:

1. **Revenue-based floor:** 4–6× Year-1 net (one-time-purchase app, niche utility
   vertical). Re-confirmed against current benchmarks: micro-SaaS 2–4× profit,
   sub-$5M deals 3–5×, private SaaS ~4.7× revenue median
   ([Acquire.com Jan 2026](https://blog.acquire.com/acquire-com-biannual-acquisition-multiples-report-jan-2026/),
   [Aventis 2026](https://aventis-advisors.com/saas-valuation-multiples/)).
2. **IP strategic premium:** $250K–$500K (Modest/Solid) or $250K–$750K (Strong)
   added for any strategic acquirer, representing the printing workflow IP and
   DOPE-Blend methodology. Deal-specific — a financial buyer pays only the floor.
3. **Direct-channel upside (additive to the floor):** the direct web purchase
   channel (`SCOPEDOPE_EXTERNAL_PURCHASE_STRATEGY.md`) captures app sales at a
   higher net than the stores, adding **~$0.8K–$1.2K (Modest) / ~$3.1K–$4.8K
   (Solid) / ~$7.7K–$12.1K (Strong)** of incremental annual net at a ~30% direct
   capture rate. This is **not** included in the Year-1 net floor below; it lifts
   the floor by 4–6× the incremental net (e.g. ~$12K–$29K at Solid) once the
   channel is live (planned post-launch). Modest contribution to the headline, but
   it is pure margin and improves the revenue-quality story.

### Scenario Valuations (corrected net band)

*The floor figures below use the store-only Year-1 net; the direct-channel upside
in methodology point 3 is incremental on top.*

**Modest (500 installs, Year-1 net $15,387–$16,605)**

| Basis | Range |
|---|---|
| Revenue floor (4–6× Year-1 net) | $62K–$100K |
| IP strategic premium | +$250K–$500K |
| **Financial buyer total** | **$50K–$100K** |
| **Strategic acquirer total** | **$312K–$600K** |

At this stage no strategic acquirer is motivated enough to initiate. An approach
here is likely a lowball; hold — the 12-month run rate does not reflect trajectory.

**Solid (2,000 installs, Year-1 net $72,494–$77,757)**

| Basis | Range |
|---|---|
| Revenue floor (4–6× Year-1 net) | $290K–$467K |
| IP strategic premium | +$250K–$500K |
| **Financial buyer total** | **$250K–$400K** |
| **Strategic acquirer total** | **$540K–$967K** |

The earliest point where an earnout-style acquisition is plausible. A $700K–$900K
acquisition at Solid Year 1 is achievable with strong strategic rationale. Do not
accept below ~$540K — the 3-year trajectory plus data-asset formation makes a
lower exit well below value.

**Strong (5,000 installs, Year-1 net $190,934–$204,580)**

| Basis | Range |
|---|---|
| Revenue floor (4–6× Year-1 net) | $764K–$1.23M |
| IP strategic premium | +$250K–$750K |
| Patent pending premium | +$200K–$500K |
| **Financial buyer total** | **$700K–$1M** |
| **Strategic acquirer total** | **$1.3M–$2.5M** |

At Strong with patent pending, ScopeDOPE is credibly a $1.5M–$2M acquisition for
NK or Hornady and $2M–$3M for Garmin with distribution upside.

### Risk Adjustment

| Scenario | Probability (est.) | Year-1 net (band) | Strategic acquisition range |
|---|---|---|---|
| Modest | 25% | $15.4K–$16.6K | $312K–$600K |
| Solid | 55% | $72.5K–$77.8K | $540K–$967K |
| Strong | 20% | $190.9K–$204.6K | $1.01M–$1.98M |

**Risk-adjusted expected acquisition value at 12 months** (using the midpoint of
each strategic range):

(0.25 × $456K) + (0.55 × $753K) + (0.20 × $1.50M) = **~$827K**

The risk-adjusted expected acquisition value at 12 months is approximately
**$800K–$850K** to a strategic acquirer, Solid scenario being the center of
gravity. *(Rev 0.9 stated ~$933K; the reduction is the store-fee correction,
partly offset by the stronger $700 Kestrel defensive math.)* This remains well
above the ~$1,445 cash invested to reach launch.

---

## 6. Printing Workflow Patent Decision

*§7 Q6: Does the wireless label printing IP warrant standalone patent pursuit prior to launch?*

### Prior Art Gap — Confirmed

Research across USPTO patent databases confirms **no existing patent covers the
complete workflow** of (1) generating a ballistic firing solution from confirmed
DOPE inputs, (2) wirelessly transmitting it to a Bluetooth thermal printer, and
(3) producing a printed scope correction label. Individual components have prior
art; the specific workflow combination is novel in the patent record as of
mid-2026. *(Founder to re-confirm via patent counsel; not independently
re-verified in this web pass.)*

### The ROI Case for Filing

**Costs:** Provisional $3K–$8K (attorney + USPTO $1,760 micro-entity); full
utility $15K–$30K through grant; maintenance $400–$7,700 over 20 years
(micro-entity).

**Benefits:** "Patent Pending" immediately on provisional filing; if granted,
blocks competitors from the identical workflow without a license; adds
$200K–$500K to any strategic acquisition; converts the most visible
differentiator from temporary first-mover advantage to a durable IP barrier.

**Competitive exposure without a patent:** once publicly launched, the 1-year US
grace period starts; a competitor who sees the workflow can file after 12 months
of public disclosure. Filing first — even a provisional — preserves priority.

### Recommendation

**File a provisional before or concurrent with v1.0 launch** ($3K–$8K; buys 12
months of "patent pending" while deferring full prosecution). **At ~5,000
installs, convert to a full utility application.** **Do not wait** to file the
provisional — it must precede public disclosure to preserve international (PCT)
rights, which close within 12 months of launch.

### Scope of Claim

Claim the **workflow**, not the hardware or the ballistic engine:

> A method for generating and producing a physical scope correction reference
> comprising: receiving confirmed downrange ballistic impact data at a first
> distance; computing an elevation and windage correction for a second distance
> using said impact data as a primary input to a ballistic model; transmitting
> said correction wirelessly via Bluetooth Low Energy to a thermal label printer;
> and printing a physical scope correction label from said thermal label printer.

Claims should be broad enough to cover any thermal printer and any BLE protocol.

---

## 7. Comparable Acquisitions

*§7 Q7: What comparable acquisitions or licensing deals exist in the outdoor sports software space that could serve as valuation benchmarks?*

### Key Finding: No Direct Comparables Exist — Re-Confirmed (2026-06)

A current web pass found **no publicly disclosed acquisition of a dedicated
ballistic calculator or precision rifle app** at any price point. This market
remains novel enough that there is no direct transaction to benchmark against.
Double-edged: buyers may anchor low (no floor reference), but there is also no
market-clearing price that caps a motivated strategic deal — particularly NK in
defensive mode.

### Adjacent Comparables

**Applied Ballistics / Kestrel integration.** AB provides the engine and BC
library for Kestrel hardware under an undisclosed licensing arrangement; AB
remains independent. Closest direct analog (precision rifle ballistic software in
hardware at commercial scale); validates the commercial model but offers no price
benchmark.

**Garmin / DeLorme (inReach), 2016.** Garmin acquired DeLorme's inReach satellite
business (hardware + software); deal size undisclosed; grew it into Garmin's
primary outdoor safety platform. Comparable rationale: niche outdoor
software/hardware with a dedicated user base acquired for distribution and
ecosystem expansion. Scale much larger than ScopeDOPE.

**onX Maps.** $1.4B valuation, **Series C**, $387.7M raised
([PitchBook](https://pitchbook.com/profiles/company/225762-85),
[Premier Alts](https://www.premieralts.com/companies/onxmaps/funding-history)).
Not a comparable deal (massive scale), but validates that niche outdoor software
built on community engagement and premium utility commands high multiples at
scale. *(Rev 0.9 said "Series B"; corrected to Series C.)*

**BaseMap / HuntScore (Jan 2024).** Niche hunting GPS app acquired a complementary
niche analytics app on undisclosed terms — closest structural comparable
(niche outdoor app buying a complementary niche app). Undisclosed terms suggest a
small transaction, likely $500K–$5M, consistent with early-to-mid-stage niche
outdoor software M&A.

**Micro-SaaS / small niche app multiples (2026, re-confirmed).**
- Micro-SaaS / small apps: **2–4× annual profit**
- Sub-$5M owner-operated deals: **3–5×** (lower band; typical deal <$2M)
- Private SaaS: **~4.7× EV/revenue** median
([Acquire.com Jan 2026](https://blog.acquire.com/acquire-com-biannual-acquisition-multiples-report-jan-2026/),
[Aventis 2026](https://aventis-advisors.com/saas-valuation-multiples/))

These are financial-buyer multiples. Strategic acquirers pay 2–5× above these
floors when the target has specific IP or market-position value.

### Constructed Benchmark

With no direct comparable, the defensible framework combines: (1) development-cost
replacement (financial floor) $450K–$800K; (2) niche-app revenue multiple
(financial buyer) 3–5× Year-1 net; (3) strategic IP premium $250K–$750K above the
revenue multiple; (4) defensive premium (NK) 1–2× protected annual gross profit
(now **$2.8M–$5.6M** at $700 Kestrel). No single transaction validates these, but
the methodology is standard for early-stage software IP with strong strategic
rationale and no price history.

---

## 8. Summary Valuation Table

| Stage | Install count | Revenue basis (corrected band) | Financial buyer | Strategic acquirer | NK defensive |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-launch | 0 | None | $50K–$200K | $500K–$1.5M | $500K–$2M |
| Modest Year 1 | 500 | $15.4K–$16.6K net | $50K–$100K | $312K–$600K | $400K–$800K |
| Solid Year 1 | 2,000 | $72.5K–$77.8K net | $250K–$400K | $540K–$967K | $700K–$1.2M |
| Strong Year 1 | 5,000 | $190.9K–$204.6K net | $700K–$1M | $1.3M–$2.5M | $1.5M–$3M |
| Solid Year 3 (est.) | ~10,000 | ~$250K net + ARR | — | $750K–$2M (rev) | $1.5M–$3M+ |
| Strong Year 3 + data license | ~15,000+ | ~$670K net + B2B | — | $2M–$6M | $3M–$8M+ |

**All ranges assume no printing workflow patent.** Add $200K–$500K at any stage
where a provisional or granted patent exists.

**Risk-adjusted expected acquisition value at 12 months post-launch:
approximately $800K–$850K** to a strategic acquirer under probability-weighted
scenario assumptions (25% Modest / 55% Solid / 20% Strong).

---

## Appendix — Key Assumptions and Caveats

1. Revenue figures from `SCOPEDOPE_REVENUE_PROJECTION.md` — blended in-app fee
   **15.0%–21.5%** (pending CBB Apps Experience enrollment and the settling
   Apple/Google legal picture). Pricing $29.99 launch / $44.99 primary.
2. Strategic-acquirer multiples re-confirmed against
   [Acquire.com biannual report (Jan 2026)](https://blog.acquire.com/acquire-com-biannual-acquisition-multiples-report-jan-2026/)
   and [Aventis Advisors software valuation benchmarks (2026)](https://aventis-advisors.com/saas-valuation-multiples/).
3. IP premium estimates use patent-valuation methodology (cost-to-develop +
   market-exclusivity value), not comparable-transaction data, which does not
   exist for this IP category.
4. "Printing workflow patent" assumes a US utility patent granted within 24–36
   months of provisional filing. PCT international coverage adds $20K–$50K and is
   not assumed here.
5. NK defensive model assumes ScopeDOPE reaches 10,000+ installs and begins
   displacing Kestrel 5700 sales at the corrected **~$700** price. Pre-launch,
   this risk is speculative; at 5,000 installs it is demonstrable.
6. Applied Ballistics remains independent as of mid-2026 and now markets a
   free/freemium "Quantum" tier. Any NK acquisition of ScopeDOPE would need to
   navigate the AB/Kestrel relationship carefully.
7. **Time-sensitive:** Apple Supreme Court cert/stay (~late June/early July 2026)
   and Google fee rollout (June 30, 2026) are unresolved at draft date. Both
   affect the store-fee band and thus every revenue-derived figure here.

---

*Confidential — Cold Bore Ballistics LLC — Do not distribute without NDA*

---

## Document Control

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| **Document owner** | `jschwefel@coldboreballisticsllc.com` |
| **Classification** | Confidential (03_-_Confidential/) |
| **Location** | `OneDrive/CBB_Corporate/03_-_Confidential/Financial_Records/SCOPEDOPE_VALUATION_ANALYSIS.md` |
| **Cross-references** | `SCOPEDOPE_VALUATION_BRIEF.md`; `SCOPEDOPE_REVENUE_PROJECTION.md` |
| **Created** | 2026-06-05 |
| **Last updated** | 2026-06-09 |
| **Next full review due** | 2027-06-05 |

---

## Revision Control Block

| Rev | Date | Changed By | Reviewed By | Approved By | Summary |
|-----|------|------------|-------------|-------------|---------|
| 0.9 | 2026-06-05 | jschwefel | — | — | Initial release |
| DRAFT | 2026-06-09 | Claude Code | — | — | Web-sourced refresh: store fee corrected to 15.0%–21.5% band; Year-1 net rebased; Kestrel $560→$700 (defensive math up); AB Quantum / 4DOF $4.99 / onX Series C corrected; comparables re-confirmed; risk-adjusted EV ~$933K→~$827K; Apple SCOTUS + Google rollout flagged provisional. Also (same date): fixed "DOPE-blend"→"DOPE-Blend™" and removed banned "DOPE-blend ballistic engine"/"DOPE-blend engine" naming → "DOPE-Blend methodology" per BRAND_LEGAL_LANGUAGE_GUIDE; applied ™ to first use of ScopeDOPE/Cold Bore Ballistics. Folded direct-channel revenue upside into §5 methodology (additive to the floor; ~$0.8K–$12.1K/yr by scenario). |
